{"id":1308,"date":"2017-06-21T13:48:16","date_gmt":"2017-06-21T11:48:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/?p=1308"},"modified":"2017-06-21T13:48:16","modified_gmt":"2017-06-21T11:48:16","slug":"issue-21-looking-through-the-agenda-beyond-neoliberalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/sayilar-en\/issue-21-looking-through-the-agenda-beyond-neoliberalism\/","title":{"rendered":"Issue 21 – Looking through the Agenda: Beyond Neoliberalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

Editors –\u00a0Mustafa Kemal Bay\u0131rba\u011f, Erden Atilla Aytekin<\/strong><\/h4>\n
Implications of the International Crisis (The Opening Lecture of Ankara University for the year 2009\/10)<\/h5>\n
Korkut Boratav<\/h5>\n

In this short article, Boratav presents a multifaceted analysis of the economic crisis that broke out in 2008. The author, first, points out the nexus between the actual crisis and some structural
\ntendencies that have been present in the economy of the United States of America, qualified
\nas a \u201cdangerous state of senility\u201d by the author. In the following sections of the article, Boratav
\nputs the emphasis on the fact that any system of economic relations that is based on financial
\ncapital is prone, by the very nature of this system, to produce a crisis. Moreover, according to
\nBoratav, crisis tendencies that appeared in the metropolitan (centre) countries will affect several
\ncountries (Latin America, Turkey, some countries of Eastern Europe, and Russia, among others), and will exert a negative effect on the take-off process they have recently entered. The author criticizes the insensitiveness of the policy-makers, and questions to what extent this insensitivity is a result of unawareness. If crisis remedies are merely concerned with a change in the nature of those actors\/institutions that are supposed to regulate economy (including a re-configuration of global power balance) not a single change in the socio-economic system or a shift in the type of policy instruments to intervene with\/regulate the economy seem possible, argues the author.<\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0Economic Crisis of 2008, financial capital, policy-makers, metropolitan (centre) countries, Turkey.<\/p>\n

Middle Class Perception of Kurds in \u0130zmir: Space, Class and Urban Life<\/h5>\n
Cenk Sara\u00e7o\u011flu<\/h5>\n

This article aims to investigate the social origins of recently increasing anti-Kurdish sentiments
\namong middle class citizens living in Izmir. Based on a field study and 90 in-depth interviews
\nconducted in this city in 2007, this article argues that the middle-class perception of Kurds can
\nbe conceptualized as \u201cexclusive recognition\u201d (tan\u0131yarak d\u0131\u015flama). Exclusive recognition implies
\nthat in middle class discourse Kurds are recognized as a separate and homogenous ethnic
\ngroup; however this recognition necessarily includes a discursive exclusion, as middle class
\ncitizens construct what it means to be a Kurd through pejorative stereotypes such as \u201cignorant\u201d,
\n\u201cseparatist\u201d, \u201cinvaders\u201d, \u201cliving by ill-gotten gain\u201d and \u201cdisrupters of urban life\u201d. These stereotypes have been long used in Turkish society for different purposes and in different contexts; but what is distinctive in exclusive recognition is the ethnicization of these stereotypes, that is, the deployment of these stereotypes to identify and construct what it means to be a Kurd. As the logic of exclusive recognition is at odds with the mainstream assimilationist discourses of the state and nationalist political parties, it cannot be seen as a typical extension of Turkish nationalism in society. Nor is it a sporadic reaction to the recent political developments in Turkey. A close examination of the narratives collected through the in-depth interviews indicate that such perception carries the traces of the social and spatial relationships between the Kurdish migrants that flooded into Izmir since the mid 1980s and middle-class citizens that live in this\u00a0city for a longer period. This does not mean that urban social life in Izmir is the cause of exclusive recognition; it is rather the locus of these anti-Kurdish sentiments, that is, the context on which they take their particular form. Therefore, a comprehensive investigation of these sentiments should include an endeavour to unravel the processes and mechanisms through which such a context has been historically formed. In view of this, this article turns its attention to forced migration of Kurds and neo-liberal transformation of urban economy as the structural factors that help us to explain the formation of the urban context of exclusive recognition. The article claims that the specific middle class experience of this transformed urban context is embedded in their prejudices against Kurdish migrants. While establishing such linkages between macro and micro level of analysis, the article examines, one by one, how middle class interviewees justify identifying the Kurds with \u201cignorance\u201d, \u201cliving by ill-gotten gain\u201d, \u201cseparatism\u201d, \u201cinvasion\u201d and \u201cdisruption of urban life\u201d.<\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong> Kurds, \u0130zmir, recognition, middle class, urban economy.<\/p>\n

Positive Perspectives on Kemalism from the Socialist Left (1920 – 1971): Reasons, Possibilities, Periods and Consequences
\nG\u00f6khan At\u0131lgan<\/h5>\n

The aim of this article is to analyze the relation between the Turkish Socialist Movement and
\nKemalism and to establish its political outcomes. The period that is taken into consideration
\nstarts with the year 1920, when the Communist Party of Turkey was born, and ends with the
\n1971 military coup, organized by some Kemalists and targeted the working class movement and
\nsocialists. The main problematic of the article is how the socialist movement looks positively to
\nKemalism, despite the fact that Kemalists, aside exceptional periods, adopted a harsh attitude
\nagainst the workers\u2019 and socialist movements, assuming that these would bring nothing but
\ndivision to the nation, while Kemalism itself aimed the creation of a national bourgeoisie
\nand capitalism through the hands of the state. The article analyses the reasons behind this
\ncontradiction, looking at both the reasons emanating from the special features of Turkish
\nSocialist Movement and also the characteristics of Kemalism that allowed such a positive
\noutlook. The analysis, on the one hand, is conducted at a discourse level. At this level, it discusses the conditions of possibility of the articulation between socialist thought and Kemalism. At another level, it studies how the positive relations between Kemalism and socialism were shaped under various historical and political conditions. The article also deals with the outcomes for the Turkish Socialist Movement of lending positive connotations to Kemalism, supporting it politically in some periods and expressing itself through the language of Kemalism.<\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0Turkish Socialist Movement,\u00a0Kemalism,\u00a01971 military coup, 1920,\u00a0national bourgeoisie.<\/p>\n

Some Observations and Considerationson Ergenekon Trials and Left Wing Approaches
\nMustafa Bayram M\u0131s\u0131r<\/h5>\n

Polarisation between Turkish bourgeois political forces that has deepened during the time
\nof Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments is continuing with rendering Ergenekon
\ntrials as its subject. This article will provide a concise overview of the judicial process and assess various left wing stances that tend to side with respective parties of the procedure, and in particular, will analyse the socialist left\u2019s independent position with its pretexts. By a factual
\nview, it can be observed that \u2018paramilitary gangs\u2019 and \u2018coup attempts\u2019 are prosecuted in the
\ncourse of this unfinished process of investigations and trials. Nevertheless, it becomes obvious that the process goes beyond prosecution, in order to form a sort of \u2018martial law\u2019 and target
\nall opponents of AKP as part of a process of political and social reconstruction. Liberal left
\nthat views AKP\u2019s electoral victory as a \u2018conservative revolution\u2019 deems AKP governments\u2019 main
\ngoal as weakening the military mandate through prospects of European Union membership
\nand democratisation and consider Ergenekon trials as a part of these prospects. Nationalist
\nleft, on the other hand, is arguing that AKP governments\u2019 major direction is determined by regional interests of the USA and the project of a moderate Islamic state, considering the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) as the guarantor of the Republic\u2019s democratic achievements, secularismin particular, against AKP governments\u2019 moves to deteriorate them, therefore, reaching the conclusion that TSK should be kept exempt from criticism. The proponents of this current view Ergenekon trials as an assault to destroy TSK and republican forces. According to the socialist left, both approaches lack an analysis of class struggles and do not harbour the potential to give way to political consequences on behalf of workers and the oppressed. Although socialist left\u2019s approach, based on a generalised analysis of class struggle, methodologically underlines a common and tactical \u2018third party\u2019 policy, particularist readings of class struggle bear the potential to contemplate different analyses such as viewing the process as an internal conflict of the bourgeoisie or perceiving AKP governments as a long-term hegemonic project of the capitalist class.<\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0Ergenekon trials,\u00a0Justice and Development Party (AKP),\u00a0Turkish Armed Forces (TSK),\u00a0socialist left,\u00a0\u2018third party\u2019 policy.<\/p>\n

March 2009 Elections and the JDP: An Evaluation on the Political Geography of Turkey
\nAli Ekber Do\u011fan<\/h5>\n

This article addresses political and socio-spatial consequences of the local elections in the
\nframework of four main questions: How can election results be evaluated in terms of the party
\nin power, the JDP (Justice and Development Party), which turned the election into a sort of
\nreferendum for its policies? Given that the election results indicate a downward trend in the
\nelectoral support for the JDP, how could the election results be interpreted as long as we are
\nconcerned with the policy positions of three major opposition parties (the Republican People\u2019s
\nParty, the Nationalist Movement Party, and the Party of Democratic Society) in the parliament?
\nOther key questions covered in this article are as follows: Among the opposition parties, which
\none came to the fore and had an upper hand (And, in that regard, how to interpret the political
\nmap of Turkey drawn after the elections?; Was there any relationship between the dropping JDP
\nvotes and the social effects of the economic crisis that broke out 5 months before the election?<\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong> March 2009 local elections,\u00a0JDP (Justice and Development Party),\u00a0economic crisis,\u00a0political map of Turkey, opposition parties.<\/p>\n

New Regionalism and Denizli: Rethinking Local Industrial Development and Transformation
\nMehmet Penbecio\u011flu<\/h5>\n

In the last two decades it has been widely argued that local\/regional scale has become
\na strategic site for local competitiveness and economic development within the capitalist global economy. Such New Regionalist accounts neglect the role of class relations and tensions, uneven development and political conflicts in the construction of competitive local industrial structures. This study develops a critical political-economic perspective to challenge arguments and assumptions of the New Regionalism approach. Drawing on the local industrial development and transformation processes of Denizli, this article attempts to shed some light
\non the tensions and political conflicts between different classes by investigating intra-firm
\nand inter-firm relations, conflicts and tensions between different discourses of powerful local
\nbusiness communities and industrial unions. Within the context of this article, investigated
\naspects of local industrial restructuring are; different mechanisms in articulation to increasing
\nglobal competition, industrial performance, employment, working conditions and local
\nindustrial policies in the post-2000 period. The qualitative survey method, which had been made
\nthrough in-depth interviews with different firms, local governments, local business associations
\nand industrial unions, is taken as the basis of inquiry in the study. This article suggests that New Regionalist accounts have neglected and obscured tensions and political conflicts between
\ndifferent classes. Such class tensions and conflicts could be analyzed through investigating the
\nhegemonic activities of local capital, changing power relations in inter-firm relations and survival
\nstrategies of uncompetitive small firms and working classes.<\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong> New Regionalism, Denizli, local industrial development, power relations, social classes.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Editors –\u00a0Mustafa Kemal Bay\u0131rba\u011f, Erden Atilla Aytekin Implications of the International Crisis (The Opening Lecture of Ankara University for the year 2009\/10) Korkut Boratav…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1308","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-sayilar-en"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1308","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1308"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1308\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1310,"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1308\/revisions\/1310"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1308"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1308"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.praksis.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1308"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}